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ABSTRACT
Objective To evaluate alternative strategies for improving
the uptake of benefits of a community based health
insurance scheme by its poorest members.
Design Prospective cluster randomised controlled trial.
Setting Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA)
community based health insurance scheme in rural India.
Participants 713 claimants at baseline (2003) and 1440
claimants two years later among scheme members in 16
rural sub-districts.
Interventions After sales service with supportive
supervision, prospective reimbursement, both packages,
and neither package, randomised by sub-district.
Main outcome measures The primary outcome was
socioeconomic status of claimants relative to members
living in the same sub-district. Secondary outcomes were
enrolment rates in SEWA Insurance, mean socioeconomic
status of the insured population relative to the general
rural population, and rate of claim submission.
Results Between 2003 and 2005, the mean
socioeconomic status of SEWA Insurance members
(relative to the rural population of Gujarat) increased
significantly. Rates of claims also increased significantly,
on average by 21.6 per 1000 members (P<0.001).
However, differences between the intervention groups
and the standard scheme were not significant. No
systematic effect of time or interventions on the
socioeconomic status of claimants relative tomembers in
the same sub-district was found.
Conclusions Neither intervention was sufficient to ensure
that the poorer members in each sub-district were able to
enjoy the greater share of the scheme benefits. Claim
submission increased as a result of interventions that
seem to have strengthened awareness of and trust in a
community based health insurance scheme.
Trial registration Clinical trials NCT00421629.
INTRODUCTION
Poor people in developing countries are less likely to
seek care when sick than those who are better off.1-3
The costs of care can drive the poor deeper into
poverty.4 Community based health insurance can
potentially protect people from healthcare costs and
ensure equitable pooling of risk between richer and
poorer, and sick and healthy, members.5 The World
Health Organization has called for investigation of
mechanisms to bring the poor into such schemes.6
Empirical evidence suggests, however, that the
scope for equitable redistribution of resources through
community based health insurance schemes is limited.
Membership is generally small7; schemes cover on
average around 10% of target populations.8 Commu-
nity based health insurance has tended to exclude the
poorest people from membership,9 10 generally char-
ging a flat premium that is unaffordable.9 Within
schemes, utilisation of health care may be inequitable
(or equity neutral), although evidence is limited. Utili-
sation of health care by insured members has been
found to be higher among households located close
to health facilities, probably the better off ones.9 11 Stu-
dies in Rwanda and the Philippines found that utilisa-
tionby socioeconomic statuswas equity neutral among
insured people and inequitable among uninsured
people.12 13
According to WHO, more than 75% of total expen-
diture on health in India is private,14 and most of this
flows directly from households in the form of out of
pocket payments to the private, for profit healthcare
sector. Because poor people lack the resources to pay
for health care, they are far more likely than less poor
people to avoid going for care or to become indebted
or impoverished trying to pay for it.15 The richest fifth
of the population are six times more likely than the
poorest fifth tohavebeen admitted to hospital,whether
in the public or private sector.16 Peters and colleagues
estimated that at least 24% of all Indians admitted to
hospital fall below the poverty line because of their
admission and that out of pocket spending on hospital
care might have raised by two percentage points the
proportion of the population in poverty.15 Less than
10% of the population (roughly 75 million people)
are covered by some form of health insurance, and
the vast majority of these are either civil servants or
formal sector workers.17 18
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Debate continues as to whether insurance is a
viable model for tackling the problems of limited
access and medical indebtedness in poor commu-
nities in India. The World Health Report 2000
noted that prepayment schemes (including commu-
nity based health insurance) represent themost effec-
tive way to protect people from the costs of health
care and called for investigation into mechanisms to
bring poor people into such schemes.6 India’s
National Health Policy (2002) encouraged the setting
up of private insurance companies and the introduc-
tion of government funded district based insurance
schemes on a pilot basis.19 Although the private
insurance sector has grown tremendously in recent
years and implementation of pilot district based
schemes has increased, empirical data about the
impact of insurance among poor communities are
lacking. Evidence on community based health insur-
ance schemes in India suggests that they tend to have
limited coverage of the population and that the poor-
est people often find the premiums prohibitively
expensive but that they do provide important finan-
cial protection among people who are able to
enrol.20-22
We assessed interventions aimed at improving the
distributional impact of a community based health
insurance scheme in rural India, by means of a cluster
randomised trial. We believe it to be the first study to
examine whether community based health insurance
schemes can be made more equitable in terms of
improving the uptake of benefits by poorer members.
Cluster randomised design is not uncontroversial for
the evaluationof complex interventions,23 andwewere
interested in exploring the feasibility and value of such
a design,24 as well as seeking to collect relevant data on
context and processes.25-27
METHODS
Since 1992, the Self Employed Women’s Association
(SEWA)—a trade union of more than half a million
poor women working in the informal sector and
based in the Indian state of Gujarat—has been
Table 1 | Objectives of interventions, with corresponding functions and processes
Objectives of interventions Functions and processes
Standard scheme
To recruit members, and provide them with support between
the annual enrolment campaigns
House to house visits to members’ homes are rarely made by SEWA Insurance aagewan. Refresher visits to villages during the
nine month period between campaigns occur very infrequently. Insured members are not guided in terms of types of facilities
that they should use if they need inpatient care
To provide aagewans with training and supervision. SEWA Insurance aagewans receive most of their supervision from district specific team leaders, in the setting of a weekly (or
fortnightly) meeting, and they receive capacity building once every few months in the setting of cluster meetings, which bring
together the aagewans of several districts. Rarely do they receive direct guidance in planning their village visits, direct
supervision during their visits, or feedback on the number, location, and quality of their visits
To process members’ hospital admission insurance claims Responsibility for compiling an insurance claim lies primarily with the insured members. Members are supposed to present
the required documents to an aagewan or SEWA office in order to submit a claim. Not uncommonly, the aagewans help
members to get the required documents if the member faces difficulty. Reimbursement of successful claims generally occurs
between two weeks and two months after the claim is submitted to SEWA Insurance
After sales service and supportive supervision
To improve members’ understanding of the insurance
(particularly the hospital admission component) and the
requirements for making a claim
Aagewans will make house to house visits among all insured households, so that each member household is visited at least
twice after enrolment. Aagewans will provide information tailored to local language and culture
To ensure thatmembers have ready access to the information
needed to submit a claim
Members will periodically be provided with a wall piece reminding them of the insurance and providing a local contact
telephone number. They will also be provided with a preaddressed, prestamped postcard that is to be mailed to SEWA
Insurance if they need assistance or have a claim to submit
To ensure that after sales service is particularly strong among
the poorest members
Equity sensitisation among aagewans, to include a participatory poverty mapping exercise in the sub-district to which the
aagewan is assigned and ongoing reminders of the barriers that prevent the poorest members from availing themselves of the
hospital admission benefits. Ensuring that house to house visits include (or focus on) the poorest members
To provide aagewans with an increased level of support and
supervision
Provide aagewans with a list of all members in their sub-district and their addresses. Jointly develop visit plans for house to
house visits (“microplanning”). Monitor progress with the house to house visits by using bar codes (to be collected by
aagewans at member household). Accompany aagewans on their house to house visits, intensively in the initial weeks and
gradually reduced. Hold regular meetings with aagewans to review their work and build capacity. Periodic visits to randomly
selected villages to seek community input on the performance of aagewans. This monitoring and accompanying will initially
be done by the research team and will gradually be passed over to the operations team where staff are available
To involve aagewans indeveloping the intervention inorder to
increase acceptability and sustainability
Self assessment exercises with aagewans to identify their training and information needs
Prospective reimbursement
To direct members to inpatient facilities with acceptable
levels of quality
A standardised procedure is developed for screening hospitals for inclusion in this scheme. Even after inclusion, hospital
performance is periodically re-evaluated
To facilitate access to hospital admission by removing
financial barriers
Members are encouraged to use (relatively) low cost public and trust hospitals in (or near) their sub-district. For two such
hospitals in each sub-district, mechanisms are developed so that 80% of the total, predicted cost of hospital admission is
paid directly to the claimant within 48-72 hours of admission. The balance of the cost (up to 2000 rupees) will be paid to the
claimant at the time of discharge from hospital, on the condition that relevant certificates and receipts are produced
To make it easier to claim and receive benefits under the
scheme
Members will be reminded about the benefits of the hospital admission insurance and educated about prospective
reimbursement in a campaign delivered by aagewans and staff of the research team. Responsibilities for compilation and
submission of claims are (largely) shifted away from SEWA Insurance members (and their families) and on to SEWA staff
SEWA=Self Employed Women’s Association.
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providing insurance to its members and their families.
The insurance is voluntary, combining insurance for
assets, life, and hospital admission in a single policy.
Women are the principal members and can also buy
insurance for their husbands and children.
Most members—more than 97% of those who joined
in 2003—pay an annual premiumof 85 rupees (£1; €1.5;
$2) for the least expensivepolicy.This covers the costs of
inpatient care to a maximum of 2000 rupees a year.
Members can also make a one time fixed deposit of
1000 rupees in SEWA Bank, and interest from this
deposit is used to pay the annual premium. Members
with fixed deposits account for roughly 30% of current
members. In 2003, SEWAInsurancehad 101809mem-
bers in Gujarat state, two thirds of them (67 584) in rural
areas and one third (33080) in Ahmedabad City. The
scheme is run by a team of fulltime staff and local
women leaders (aagewans), who form the critical link
between members and scheme administrators.
Surveys in 2003 found that the poorest households
in the general population were able to enrol in the
scheme.28 In rural areas, for example, 32% ofmembers
were drawn from households below the 30th centile of
socioeconomic status, and 8% of members were from
thepoorest tenth.The submissionof claims for hospital
admission was equitable in Ahmedabad City; how-
ever, in rural areas, financially better off members
were significantly more likely to submit claims than
were the poorest members. Qualitative research
revealed that poor people faced barriers to accessing
hospitals with inpatient facilities, such as lack of
money to pay for the hospital admission or travel to
hospital,29 and barriers to filing an insurance claim,
such as lack of skills and capabilities, the costs of com-
piling a claim, and lack of cooperation from doctors.
On the basis of these insights, we developed and
tested in a randomised trial the impact of two inter-
ventions that aimed to improve the equity of claims
in rural areas. These interventions were after sales ser-
vice and supportive supervision, andprospective reim-
bursement, implemented singly and together (table 1).
After sales service and supportive supervision
involved aagewansmaking house to house educational
visits to SEWA Insurance members after enrolment
and providing supportive supervision to the workers.
In addition to education, households were provided
with a reminder wall piece and a prestamped and pre-
addressed postcard for communicating with SE
WA Insurance. Prospective reimbursement involved
making arrangements with two hospitals in each sub-
district so that members could be reimbursed before
discharge from hospital. In communities that received
both interventions (the “both” intervention area), these
were implemented simultaneously and in an integrated
manner. To enhance the generalisability of our find-
ings, we defined the interventions in terms of processes
rather than simple elements.30 Thus, under the pro-
spective reimbursement intervention, we improved
financial access to hospital admission by developing
mechanisms so that 80% of the predicted cost of hospi-
tal admission (up to a maximum of 1600 rupees) could
be reimbursed within 48 hours of admission, but the
specifics of the intervention—for example, the type of
person responsible for paying the cash benefit—varied
between sub-districts.
Assessing the effectiveness of such interventions is
important to public health and health care in India
Table 2 | Household level data collection to assess primary outcome (socioeconomic status)
Characteristic
Survey of general, rural
population Baseline member survey Baseline claimant census Follow-up member survey Follow-up claimant census
Sampling universe Households in 11 rural districts
(2001 population, 19 298 638)
from which SEWA Insurance
draws its members
36 837 adult female members
in 2003 who reside in 16 rural
sub-districts
713hospital admission claims,
January to September 2003
25 497 adult female members
in 2005 who reside in 16 rural
sub-districts
1440 hospital admission
claims, April to December, 2005
Intended sample size 800 1200 713 1200 1440
Sampling method Two stage random sampling Two stage random sampling,
stratified by sub-district
NA (all claimants interviewed) Two stage random sampling,
stratified by sub-district
NA (all claimants interviewed)
Sampling at first
stage
Towns/villages sampled with
PPS
Villages (or clusters of villages)
sampled with PPS
NA Villages (or clusters of villages)
sampled with PPS
NA
Sampling at second
stage
Randomly selected start point,
then every second household
Systematic random sampling
from list
NA Systematic random sampling
from list
NA
Fieldwork dates 22 May to 5 August 2003 16 October to 24 December
2003
16 December 2003 to 25
February 2004
19 May to 21 December 2005 13 January to 8 April 2006
Interviewers 10 SEWA Insurance
interviewers
10 SEWA Insurance
interviewers
20 district based, SEWA rural
development interviewers
10 SEWA Insurance
interviewers
10 SEWA Insurance interviewers
Criteria for counting
household as absent
No Hh member present on day
of first (and only) visit
No Hh member contacted after
two visits separated by
minimum of 24 hours
No Hh member contacted after
two visits separated by
minimum of 24 hours
No Hh member contacted after
two visits separated by
minimum of 24 hours
No Hh member contacted after
two visits separated by
minimum of 24 hours
Achieved sample size 784 (98%) 967 (81%) 674 (95%) 1072 (89%) 1326 (92%)
Reasons for “non-
response”
Refusedinterview,n=1(6%);all
Hh members absent, n=15
(94%)
Hh moved/not found, n=202
(87%); all Hhmembers absent,
n=31 (13%)
Refused interview, n=2 (5%);
Hh moved/not found, n=27
(69%); all Hhmembers absent,
n=10 (26%)
Hh moved/not found, n=72
(56%); all Hhmembers absent,
n=56 (44%)
Hh moved/not found, n=55
(48%); all Hh members absent,
n=59 (52%)
Hh=household; NA=not applicable; PPS=probability proportional to size; SEWA=Self Employed Women’s Association.
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and elsewhere, given the widespread inequities in use
of health services.2 16 The Indian health system has
characteristics that make it less accessible to poor peo-
ple, including user fees; stigmatisation bymedical staff;
and a paucity of health workers, clinics, and hospitals
where poor people live, in rural areas and urban
slums.15 Removing such supply-side barriers is difficult
for non-governmental organisations, given their lim-
ited financial resources and the complete absence of
regulatory checks and balances to guide and support
them in rehabilitating the healthcare system.31 Com-
munity based organisations can, however, tackle select
social, economic, and cultural factors that prevent peo-
ple from seeking health care. Great interest exists in
evaluating the impact of such interventions on disease
prevention and access to health care in India and
elsewhere.32-34
To reduce contamination, we randomised the trial at
the level of sub-districts, an existing administrative
unit. We considered sub-districts for inclusion if they
had 500 or more female SEWA Insurance members
aged 18 or above in 2003. Out of the 27 sub-districts
that met this criterion, we excluded those in which all
members were mandatorily enrolled in the scheme by
a donor agency (three sub-districts) or which had no
general hospital of 25 beds or more (one sub-district).
Of the remaining 23 sub-districts, we selected the 16
with the highest number of female SEWA Insurance
members. These sub-districts spanned a large agricul-
tural area in the north of Gujarat state.
Within the selected sub-districts, the interventions
were to be delivered to all female and male members
of SEWA Insurance for 2004 and 2005. The only
members excluded from the interventions were those
forwhomaddress datawere so incomplete that district,
sub-district, or village could not be determined
(approximately 3.5% of members in the 2004 data-
base) and those for whom address data seemed to be
complete but who could not be found at the village
level (<1% to 8%, by sub-district, in 2004).
We randomly allocated four study sub-districts to
each of after sales service and supportive supervision,
prospective reimbursement, both, and standard
scheme (control). Interventions were launched on 1
August 2004. The first trial related visits to SEWA
Insurance member households in the three inter-
vention areas were made between August andDecem-
ber 2004. Interventions continued to the end of 2005.
The primary outcome measure was the socioeco-
nomic status of claimants relative to the membership
base in their sub-districts of residence; detailed descrip-
tionof thismeasure canbe foundelsewhere.24 Just before
the beginning of the trial, a representative survey of the
general rural population from which SEWA Insurance
draws its members gathered data on a wide range of
potentially relevant markers of socioeconomic status
(table 2).35 We then developed a summary index of
socioeconomic status for this populationbyusing survey
data, principal components analysis, and methods
described by Henry and colleagues.35 Subsequently, at
baseline and again postintervention, we determined the
distribution of socioeconomic status among SEWA
Insurance members by representative surveys of mem-
bers’ households in the 16 trial sub-districts. We ranked
the membership base in each sub-district according to
socioeconomic status, so that the poorest household
ranked zero, the wealthiest 100, and the median house-
hold 50 (fig 1, top panel).
Interviews with members of claimants’ households
before and after the intervention enabled a sub-district
specific rank score for each claimant’s household to be
calculated (table 2), on the basis of the same socioeco-
nomic variables and index described in the previous
paragraph. For these households, we converted socioe-
conomic index values into sub-district specific rank
scores (on a scale of 0-100) by linear interpolation
based on the rank of the members’ households with
the closest (that is, the next lowest and the next highest)
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Fig 1 | Within cluster rank versus untransformed
socioeconomic index value for members (top) and members
plus claimants (middle); illustration of linear interpolation of
within cluster centile of socioeconomic status for one
claimant (bottom) (Bayad sub-district, 2003)
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socioeconomic index values (fig 1, middle and bottom
panels). We assigned rank scores of 0 and 100 to clai-
mants whose socioeconomic index values were lower
or higher than those of any sampled member in the
same sub-district.
Secondary outcomes were rates of enrolment in SE
WA Insurance, mean socioeconomic status of the
insured population relative to the general rural popu-
lation, and rate of submission of claims.
Statistical analysis
We calculated the required sample size for the trial on
the basis of the primary study outcome and took into
account the intracluster (sub-district) correlation, the
mean socioeconomic status rank score of claimants rela-
tive to schememembers at baseline, and the intracluster
variance of this parameter.36 We determined that the
minimal effect to be detected as statistically significant
would be a reduction of 20 points in the mean socioeco-
nomic status rank score of the claimants relative to
scheme members (that is, from 60 to 40). Power was set
at 90% and statistical significance at 5%, with two sided
testing throughout. This calculation suggested a mini-
mum of four clusters per intervention arm.
We stratified sub-districts by mean socioeconomic
status of claimants (relative to members) in order to
minimise imbalance across the intervention groups.
Within each of four strata, we randomly assigned sub-
districts to an intervention or standard scheme by
drawing one of four differently coloured balls from a
bag. Each colour represented one of the three inter-
vention groups or the standard scheme. The balls
were drawn without replacement. SEWA Insurance
staff did the random assignment, so that they would
understand the process and perceive the allocation as
fair. Staff were aware of the sub-district that was being
allocated but were blind to the interventions being
drawn because they could not see into the bag or feel
any difference between balls.
The trial was “open” in so far as neither the partici-
pants nor the personnel could be blinded to inter-
vention assignment after randomisation. We sought
tominimise bias by training interviewers to administer
the surveys in a uniform manner across intervention
groups and by close supervision.
The analytic strategy was that recommended by
Murray for a cluster randomised trial with a repeated
cross section (pre-test, post-test) design with a control
group.37With all the data pooled, the expected value of
the outcome indicator Y can be expressed, in a regres-
sion framework, as:
Y=α+β1.TREATMENT_GROUP+β2.TIME+β3.
TREATMENT_GROUP×TIME
where TIME is a dummy variable coded 0=baseline,
1=postintervention.This equation is a simplified repre-
sentation, as three indicator variables rather than just
one represented the different intervention groups (in
Assessed for eligibility (27 sub-districts)
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Excluded:
  Did not meet eligibilty criteria (4 sub-districts)
  Lowest numbers of insured women (7 sub-districts)
Sub-districts (n=4)
Total members (n=7865)
Mean claims/sub-district 17.5
  (range 4-37)
Lost to follow-up (n=2) (2.9%)
  Refused interview (n=0)
  Moved/not found (n=2)
  All household members
    absent (n=0)
Sub-districts (n=4)
Total members (n=11 005)
Mean claims/sub-district 43.5
  (range 8-62)
Lost to follow-up (n=9) (5.2%)
  Refused interview (n=0)
  Moved/not found (n=8)
  All household members
    absent (n=1)
Sub-districts (n=4)
Total members (n=10 026)
Mean claims/sub-district 41.0
  (range 12-56)
Lost to follow-up (n=7) (4.3%)
  Refused interview (n=1)
  Moved/not found (n=3)
  All household members
    absent (n=3)
Sub-districts (n=4)
Total members (n=15 409)
Mean claims/sub-district 76.3
  (range 14-203)
Lost to follow-up (n=21) (6.9%)
  Refused interview (n=1)
  Moved/not found (n=14)
  All household members
    absent (n=6)
Sub-districts (n=4)
Total members (n=8566)
Mean claims/sub-district 71.0
  (range 29-137)
Lost to follow-up (n=32) (11.3%)
  Refused interview (n=0)
  Moved/not found (n=10)
  All household members
    absent (n=22)
Sub-districts (n=4)
Total members (n=10 717)
Mean claims/sub-district 120.3
  (range 22-196)
Lost to follow-up (n=33) (6.9%)
  Refused interview (n=0)
  Moved/not found (n=18)
  All household members
    absent (n=15)
Sub-districts (n=4)
Total members (n=6815)
Mean claims/sub-district 79.8
  (range 23-119)
Lost to follow-up (n=17) (5.3%)
  Refused interview (n=0)
  Moved/not found (n=5)
  All household members
    absent (n=12)
Sub-districts (n=4)
Total members (n=11 344)
Mean claims/sub-district 89.0
  (range 39-206)
Lost to follow-up (n=32) (9.0%)
  Refused interview (n=0)
  Moved/not found (n=22)
  All household members
    absent (n=10)
Fig 2 | Number of clusters and participants randomly assigned, receiving intended intervention, and analysed for primary
outcome
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each case contrasted with the standard scheme group),
and three interactions with time captured the net
change in each treatment group or “impact” of the pro-
gramme. We used a mixed effects regression model in
SAS to estimate all coefficients, by using the approach
ofKenward andRoger to estimate the relevant degrees
of freedom for the statistical tests.38
RESULTS
All 16 clusters randomised at baseline were retained at
follow-up (fig 2). A small percentage of interviewswere
unsuccessful both in the pre-intervention survey (2.9-
6.9% per group) and in the postintervention survey
(5.3-11.3%), primarily because the family was absent
from home at successive visits or the interviewer was
unable to locate the household.
At baseline, the four treatment groups were very
similar with respect to the primary outcome measure,
the mean socioeconomic status of claimants relative to
members in the same sub-district (table 3). Secondary
outcome indicators, on the other hand, were quite vari-
able between groups: enrolment rates were 26.7-52.6/
1000 general population, socioeconomic status of
members relative to the general population was 41.6-
51.2 per group, and submission rates for hospital
admission claims were 8.9-19.2/1000 members per
group. The standard scheme group had more “best”
values with respect to the four outcome indicators
than any other group, and the after sales service
group had “worst” values for three out of four outcome
indicators. The four groups also differed somewhat in
terms of their total population and population density
but were fairly similar with respect to the percentage of
the population that was female and literate. Members’
characteristics varied: the percentage of women who
had also enrolled their spouse was 15.6-35.5% per
intervention group and the percentage of women
who paid by fixed deposit was 6.6-19.3% per group.
Rates of coverage of the interventions were high
(table 4). In after sales service and “both” areas, for
example, 96.3% and 97.8% of respondents reported
receiving the reminderwall piece. In prospective reim-
bursement and “both” areas, 82.1% and 85.6% of
respondents reported receiving the silver identity
card needed for receipt of reimbursement in hospital.
The silver card seemed to be less memorable than the
reminder wall piece: they were distributed together in
the “both” sub-districts, yet a higher percentage of
members recalled the latter. Leakage of the inter-
ventions was minimal.
After the intervention, respondents in the inter-
vention areas were no more knowledgeable about
SEWA Insurance than those in the standard scheme
area (table 4). That is, the interventions did not seem
to have any significant impact on knowledge, as
assessed by this survey.
The survey of claimants showed that members in
different intervention areas differed significantly in
terms of how they first notified SEWA Insurance of
their claim (table 4). In prospective reimbursement
and “both” areas, claimants were 25.4-27.0 percentage
points more likely than those in the standard scheme
areas to have first notified SEWA Insurance of their
claim by calling from the hospital before discharge.
Claimants rarely used the postcards to notify SEWA
Insurance of their claim.
Between 2003 and 2005, the mean socioeconomic
status of SEWA Insurance members (relative to the
Table 3 | Baseline information for each group (interventions and standard scheme) for individual and cluster level. Values are
mean* (SD) unless statedotherwise
Standard scheme
After sales
service
Prospective
reimbursement Both
Primary and secondary outcome indicators at baseline
SES of claimants relative to members in same sub-districts 58.8 (12.8) 58.9 (11.3) 56.4 (8.5) 57.1 (10.9)
Enrolment rate (per 1000 population aged 18-55 years) 43.8 (55.7) 52.6 (85.9) 26.7 (15.9) 35.1 (27.7)
SES of scheme members relative to rural population 41.6 (4.8) 51.2 (6.2) 49.1 (6.6) 42.0 (3.3)
Rate of hospital admission claim submission (per 1000 members
per nine months)
19.2 (11.9) 8.9 (6.0) 18.4 (11.2) 17.4 (9.0)
Member factors at baseline†
Percentage households in which spouse is also covered 19.4 (6.49) 24.5 (14.1) 35.5 (25.7) 15.6 (10.1)
Percentage women, fixed deposit 10.2 (3.92) 19.3 (10.3) 6.6 (6.15) 11.4 (5.60)
Sub-district factors at baseline‡
Number 4 4 4 4
Total population: 1 105 405 996 265 1 037 084 664 835
Percentage female 47.7 (0.437) 47.8 (0.751) 47.9 (0.278) 48.6 (1.43)
Percentage literate, (aged >6 years): 65.3 (19.2) 62.4 (18.4) 67.6 (8.42) 64.1 (11.8)
Female literacy 51.6 (21.0) 49.6 (17.5) 52.8 (10.8) 50.8 (12.5)
Male literacy 77.9 (17.5) 74.2 (19.3) 81.4 (6.38) 76.8 (11.2)
Population density, people/km2 635 (432) 255 (219) 440 (500) 439 (383)
SES=socioeconomic status.
*Means for each intervention group are unweighted average of four relevant sub-district level means.
†2003 scheme membership figures.
‡Data from 2001 population census.
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rural population ofGujarat) rose significantly, on aver-
age by 6.9 on the 100 point scale (P<0.001) (table 5).
No association existed, however, between the inter-
ventions and either changes in the enrolment rate or
the change in socioeconomic status of members.
Rates of claims increased significantly, on average by
21.6 per 1000 members (P<0.001). However, differ-
ences between the intervention groups and the stan-
dard scheme were not significant. Neither time nor
interventions had any systematic effect on the socioe-
conomic status of claimants relative to members in the
same sub-district.
DISCUSSION
This trial shows that, in a community based insurance
scheme in rural Gujarat, neither switching from reim-
bursement to upfront payment nor strengthening con-
tacts between members and administrators was
sufficient to ensure that the poorer members in each
sub-district were able to enjoy the greater share of the
scheme benefits. Instead, the rate of claims increased
across the study area. This was in spite of the fact that
we achieved high rates of coverage with our inter-
ventions, with virtually no leakage from intervention
to standard scheme areas. The interventions them-
selves were designed on the basis of extensive qualita-
tive research about the barriers that might prevent
poor members making a successful claim.29
Strengths and limitations
Our trial was based on a small number of randomisa-
tion units (sub-districts) in each intervention group.
However, on the basis of the standard errors of the esti-
mated impacts of the interventions, we could have
detected as statistically significant an average change
in the socioeconomic status score of claimants relative
to members in the same sub-district of just 16 points—
an even smaller change than the 20 point change we
initially set out to detect. The trial was therefore not
underpowered on the primary outcome.
On the other hand, the trial does seem to have had
disappointingly low power with respect to the second-
ary outcomes. Large increases in rates of claims
occurred in 11/12 intervention sub-districts, compared
with only 1/4 standard scheme sub-districts (fig 3), but
these contrasts were not statistically significant if ana-
lysed intervention group by intervention group as the
study protocol demanded (table 5).We note, however,
that both interventions involved making individual
contact with members in their homes, and we are
inclined to believe that this feature of the interventions
had a greater impact than elements unique to either
specific intervention, such as the postcard, enhanced
supervision, or reimbursement before discharge from
hospital. Qualitative interviews, not documented here,
revealed that members greatly appreciated the home
visits, even though our postintervention survey sug-
gested that the visits did not increasemembers’ knowl-
edge about the scheme’s benefits or processes. The
house to house visits may have increased submission
of claims by increasing members’ trust in the scheme
or by increasing some aspect of their knowledge that
was not captured by the postintervention survey, such
as the identity of the local aagewan.
An additional limitation of the trial may have been
the short period allowed for implementation and then
stabilisation of the interventions. When we started to
monitor the primary outcome, the interventions had
been running for amaximumof eightmonths (1August
2004 to 1 April 2005). Although most of the key inter-
vention functionswere implementedwithin that period,
improvements could have been made had there been
more time. We do not think a longer implementation
period would have increased the interventions’ impact
Table 4 | Implementation and use of interventions
Indicators
Control
group Any intervention effect?
Point estimate in intervention groups, relative to control
After sales service Prospective reimbursement Both
Coverage and leakage
Received reminder wall piece 0% Yes; P<0.0001 96.3%*** (94.0% to 98.7%) 0.4% (−2.0% to 2.7%) 97.8%*** (95.4% to 100%)
Received postcard 0% Yes; P<0.0001 85.3%*** (79.8% to 90.8%) 0.4% (−5.1% to 5.9%) 84.9%*** (79.4% to 90.4%)
Received silver prospective
reimbursement card
0% Yes; P<0.0001 0.4% (−6.2% to 7.0%) 82.1%*** (75.5% to 88.8%) 85.6%*** (79.0% to 92.2%)
Knowledge about SEWA Insurance†
Know that they are currently insured 93.5% No; P=0.4357 NA NA NA
Know hospital admission is covered 81.8% No; P=0.1893 NA NA NA
Know ceiling is 2000 rupees 25.1% No; P=0.4448 NA NA NA
Know delivery is not covered 35.6% No; P=0.0916 NA NA NA
Correct out of three vignettes 1.30 No; P=0.8295 NA NA NA
Use of prospective reimbursement and postcard‡
Called from hospital 2.9% Yes; P=0.0133 0.8% (−19.1% to 20.7%) 25.4%* (5.6% to 45.2%) 27.0%* (7.2% to 46.9%)
Submitted postcard 0% Yes; P=0.0008 2.0%*** (0.9% to 3.1%) 0% (−1.0% to 1.0%) 0.3% (−0.7% to 1.4%)
NA=not applicable; SEWA=Self Employed Women’s Association.
*P<0.05.
***P<0.001.
†Results on members’ knowledge of non-health benefits not reported.
‡Means of first notifying SEWA Insurance about claim.
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on the primary outcome measure, but it may have
resulted in a greater (and possibly statistically signifi-
cant) increase in the impact on claim rate.
We believe that our trial is methodologically
highly innovative. As far as we are aware, it is one
of the first cluster randomised trials to use an equity
outcome and to evaluate a health financing inter-
vention in a developing country. The summary
index of socioeconomic status used to characterise
both claimants and members is simple and transpar-
ent, has a strong theoretical basis and a systematic
approach to indicator selection, and is locally appro-
priate—incorporating variables that are important
indicators of socioeconomic status in a particular
study setting—and the corresponding survey instru-
ment can be easily and quickly administered.39 Also,
the primary outcome measure used (the socioeco-
nomic status rank score) is simple to interpret
because it varies on a scale from 0 to 100, with 50
indicating an equity neutral outcome, and is efficient
because it draws on data from claimants and mem-
bers at all levels of socioeconomic status.
The cluster randomised design brings both advan-
tages and disadvantages. The study has strong internal
validity, and we used qualitativemethods both at base-
line and during implementation of the interventions to
understand the processes at work.28 29 Relevance to
other settings, or external validity, depends on under-
standing the context of the insurance programme and
the factors that influence its operation, including
aspects such as physical access to health services that
we were not able to cover in the trial. Basing the study
within the research cell of SEWAand involvingSEWA
staff in the research, plus the expertise of the external
researchers in community based health insurance in
India and elsewhere, meant that the team had in-
depth knowledge of both SEWA and community
based health insurance schemes elsewhere, so the rele-
vance of study findings to other settings could be
assessed, in so far as the state of knowledge on commu-
nity based health insurance permits.40
Policy implications
The lack of equity impact in our trialmayhave resulted
from a variety of factors. Firstly, the interventions did
not tackle barriers such as distance to hospital, trans-
portation costs, and the opportunity costs of hospital
admission, especially for female members with many
household responsibilities. Secondly, the interventions
were more effective than anticipated among less poor
members, suggesting that barriers faced by the poorest
people in seeking hospital admission and submitting a
claim were just as relevant to the less poor members.
Thirdly, although the interventions were designed to
meet the specific needs of the poorest members, we
had noway of delivering them selectively to these peo-
ple as it was logistically and ethically impossible to
separate the poorest members from the less poor
ones during delivery of the interventions.
SEWA Insurance is continuing and extending the
interventions because of their perceived and projected
benefits, including the increased rate of claims. The rural
claims rate is now close to that of Ahmedabad City (51
per 1000members over ninemonths in 2005), reducing
urban-rural inequities. Scheme administrators believe
that over a longer period the interventions will lead to
higher rates of retention and enrolment, by enhancing
members’ trust in and satisfaction with the scheme.
Future studies should design and test other interventions
to make the scheme more equitable.
More broadly, this study feeds into a small but devel-
oping literature onwhether andhowcommunity based
health insurance can benefit the poorest people.
SEWA insurance has some unusual features, including
its base in an organisation of which the prime goals are
to organise female workers to achieve work security,
income security, food security, and social security and
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Fig 3 | Increase in rate of claims between 2003 (tail of arrow)
and 2005 (head of arrow) by intervention group and sub-
district
Table 5 | Time effect and intervention effect†
Indicators Change in all groups (2003-5) Any intervention effect?
Members per 1000 population −13.8 (−31.8 to 4.2) No; P=0.899
SES of members (relative to population) 6.9*** (3.0 to 10.8) No; P=0.915
Claims submission per 1000 members (nine months) 21.6*** (15.4 to 27.8) No; P=0.236
SES of claimants (relative to members) −4.1 (−10.1 to 1.9) No; P=0.810
SES=socioeconomic status.
***P<0.001.
†Impacts expressed as absolute changes; point estimates, 95% confidence intervals, and P values derived from mixed effects regression models
relating each outcome to intervention group, time, and the interaction of the two, accounting appropriately for clustering within intervention areas
and within sub-districts.
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to make women individually and collectively self reli-
ant, economically independent, and capable ofmaking
their own decisions. This contrasts with an alternative
approach to community based health insurance, in
which a single purpose organisation is formed to pro-
vide insurance. The relative merits of different organi-
sational and management approaches to community
based health insurance need to be explored further.
Contributors:MKR and TS participated in the study’s conception and design,
acquisition of data, analysis and interpretation of data, and drafting the article.
MC and AJM participated in the study’s conception and design and critically
revising the article for important intellectual content. FG, RJ, and FP participated
in the acquisition of data and critically revising the article for important
intellectual content. SSM participated in the study’s conception and design,
analysis and interpretation of the data, and critically revising the article for
important intellectual content. MKR is the guarantor.
Funding:Wellcome Trust (UK).
Competing interests: None declared.
Ethical approval: Executive Committee of the Self-Employed Women’s
Association (Ahmedabad, Gujarat) and Ethics Committee of the London School
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
1 Gwatkin DR, Rustein S, Johnson K, Pande RP, Wagstaff A. Socio-
economic differences in health, nutrition and population in India.
Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000.
2 Wagstaff A. Poverty and health sector inequalities. Bull World Health
Organ 2002;80:97-105.
3 Makinen M, Waters H, Rauch M, Almagambetova N, Bitran R,
Gilson L, et al. Inequalities in health care use and expenditures:
empirical data from eight developing countries and countries in
transition. Bull World Health Organ 2000;78:55-65.
4 Xu K, Evans DB, Kawabata K, Zeramdini R, Klavus J, Murray CJL.
Household catastrophic health expenditure: amulticountry analysis.
The Lancet 2003;362:111-7.
5 Schieber G, Baeza C, Kress D, Maier M. Financing health systems in
the 21st century. In: JamisonDT, Breman JG,MeashamAR, AlleyneG,
Claeson M, Evans DB, et al, eds. Disease control priorities in
developing countries. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press,
2006:1401.
6 World Health Organization. The world health report 2000—health
systems: improving performance. Geneva: WHO, 2000.
7 International Labour Office (Universitas Programme). Extending
social protection in health through community based health
organizations: evidence and challenges. Geneva: ILO, 2002:79.
8 Ekman B. Community-based health insurance in low-income
countries: a systematic review of the evidence. Health Policy Plan
2004;19:249-70.
9 Bennett S, Creese A, Monasch R. Health insurance schemes for
people outside formal sector employment. Geneva: Division of
Analysis, Research and Assessment, World Health Organization,
1998.
10 Jakab M, Preker A, Krishnan C, Schneider P, Diop F, Jutting J, et al.
Analysis of community financing using household surveys. In:
Preker A, Carrin G, eds. Health financing for poor people: resource
mobilization and risk sharing. Washington, DC: World Bank,
2004:201-30.
11 Criel B, Van der Stuyft P, Van Lerberghe W. The Bwamanda hospital
insurance scheme: effective for whom? A study of its impact on
hospital utilization patterns. Soc Sci Med 1999;48:897-911.
12 Schneider P, Hanson K. Horizontal equity in utilisation of care and
fairness of health financing: a comparison of micro-health insurance
and user fees in Rwanda. Health Econ 2006;15:19-31.
13 Dror DM, Koren R, Steinberg DM. The impact of filipino micro health-
insurance units on income-related equality of access to healthcare.
Health Policy 2006;77:304-17.
14 World Health Organization.Working together for health: the world
health report 2006. Geneva: WHO, 2006.
15 Peters DH, Yazbeck AS, Sharma RR, Ramana GNV, Pritchett LH,
Wagstaff A. Better health systems for India’s poor: findings, analysis,
and options. Washington DC: World Bank, 2002.
16 Mahal A, Singh J, Afridi F, Lamba V, Gumber A, Selvaraju V.Who
benefits from public health spending in India? New Delhi: National
Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), World Bank, 2000.
17 Matthies S, Cahill KR. Lessons from across the World: how India can
break barriers to develop health insurance. IRDA Journal 2004;II
(11):7-12.
18 Gupta I, Trivedi M. Social health insurance redefined: health for all
through coverage for all. Econ Polit Wkly 2005;Sept 17:4132-40.
19 Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. National health policy 2002.
New Delhi: MoHFW, Government of India, 2002.
20 RansonMK. Community-based health insurance schemes in India: a
review. Natl Med J India 2003;16:79-89.
21 Devadasan N, Ranson MK, Van DammeW, Acharya A, Criel B. The
landscape of community health insurance in India: an overview
based on 10 case studies. Health Policy 2006;78:224-34.
22 RansonMK. Reduction of catastrophic health care expenditures by a
community-basedhealth insurance scheme inGujarat, India: current
experiences and challenges. Bull World Health Organ
2002;80:613-21.
23 VictoraCG,Habicht JP,Bryce J. Evidence-basedpublic health:moving
beyond randomized trials. Am J Public Health 2004;94:400-5.
24 Morris SS, Ranson MK, Sinha T, Mills AJ. Measuring improved
targeting of health interventions to the poor in the context of a
community-randomised trial in rural India.ContempClin Trials 2006;
Oct 14 doi:10.1016/j.cct.2006.10.008.
25 Hawe P, Shiell A, Riley T, Gold L. Methods for exploring
implementation variation and local context within a cluster
randomised community intervention trial. J Epidemiol Community
Health 2004;58:788-93.
26 Oakley A, Strange V, Bonell C, Allen E, Stephenson J. Process
evaluation in randomised controlled trials of complex interventions.
BMJ 2006;332:413-6.
27 Rothwell PM. External validity of randomised controlled trials: “to
whom do the results of this trial apply?” Lancet 2005;365:82-93.
28 Ranson MK, Sinha T, Chatterjee M, Acharya A, Bhavsar A, Morris SS,
et al. Making health insurance work for the poor: learning from the
Self-Employed Women’s Association’s community-based health
insurance scheme. Soc Sci Med 2006;62:707-20.
29 Sinha T, Ranson MK, Chatterjee M, Acharya A, Mills A. Barriers faced
by the poor in benefiting from community-based insurance services:
lessons learnt from SEWA Insurance, Gujarat. Health Policy Plan
2006;21:132-42.
30 Hawe P, Shiell A, Riley T. Complex interventions: how “out of control”
can a randomised controlled trial be? BMJ 2004;328:1561-3.
31 Bhat R. Regulation of the private health sector in India. Int J Health
Plann Manage 1996;11:253-74.
32 Ghosh SK, Patil RR, Tiwari S, Dash AP. A community-based health
education programme for bio-environmental control of malaria
through folk theatre (Kalajatha) in rural India.Malar J 2006;5:123.
33 Gwatkin DR, Wagstaff A, Yazbeck A, eds. Reaching the poor with
health, nutrition and population services: what works, what doesn’t,
and why. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005.
34 World Bank.World development report 2006: equity and
development. Washington, DC: World Bank (and Oxford University
Press), 2005.
35 Henry C, Sharma M, Lapenu C, Zeller M. Assessing the relative
poverty ofmicrofinance clients: a CGAPoperational tool.Washington,
DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2000.
36 Hayes RJ, Bennett S. Simple sample size calculation for cluster-
randomized trials. Int J Epidemiol 1999;28:319-26.
37 Murray DM. Design and analysis of group-randomized trials. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
38 KenwardMG, Roger JH. Small sample inference for fixed effects from
restricted maximum likelihood. Biometrics 1997;53:983-97.
39 Morris SS. Epidemiology and the study of socio-economic
inequalities in health. In: INDEPTH Network, ed.Measuring health
equity in small areas—findings from demographic surveillance
systems. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005:1-18.
40 Task Force on Health Systems Research. Informed choices for
attaining the millennium development goals: towards an
international cooperative agenda for health-systems research.
Lancet 2004;364:997-1003.
Accepted: 20 March 2007
WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC
Community based health insurance is often cited as a means of improving access to health
care and financial protection in developing countries
The scope for equitable redistribution of resources by such schemes may be limited by small
membership, exclusion of the poorest people, and inequitable utilisation of benefits
No previous study has evaluated strategies for improving the uptake of benefits of a
community based health insurance scheme by its poorest members
WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS
Neither switching from reimbursement to upfront payment nor strengthening contacts
between members and administrators was sufficient to ensure that poorer members were
able to enjoy the greater share of the scheme’s benefits
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